The main contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly 
Introduction
In recent years the concept of social norm has become very popular among behavioral and experimental economists interested in deviations from purely selfish behavior. Notwithstanding the increasing attention paid to the concept, a systematic study of social norms as motivational drivers for economic agents is still lacking. At empirical level, no or little effort has been made to find a way to observe the creation of social norms in the laboratory. At theoretical level, the social preferences (Bolton, 1991; Bolton and Ockenfelds 1998; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002 ) and reciprocity models (Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) incorporate normative principles within individual preferences instead of treating them as separate objects. This prevents explanation of compliance with a social norm in a context where the norm prescribes a choice which implies a cost in terms of material self interest, where external enforcement (through sanctions or rewards) is not feasible (for example, due to imperfect monitoring), and where reputational mechanisms cannot be effective due to ex-post non-verifiability or to the fact that the interaction is one-shot (Faillo and Sacconi, 2007) .
In what follows we seek to fill these gaps by describing an experimental procedure in which a norm is created by means of an ex-ante impartial agreement among the members of a group. In particular, we consider a context in which the norm arises from agreement on a rule on how to play a one-shot game which follows the agreement, and in which subjects must decide how to divide a sum of money among themselves. The agreement is reached by subjects who vote for the rule behind a veil of ignorance, i.e. before they know what their role in the game will be. By means of this procedure we reproduced in the laboratory a situation in which the subjects first participated in a "constitutional" stage in definition of a non-binding norm and then discovered their roles in the game and decided whether or not to comply with the norm.
We explain the subjects' decision to comply with the norm in this specific context in two steps. First, we posit a "conditional compliance" hypothesis, according to which, in a strategic interaction among N players, player i's decision to comply with a shared norm dictating a choice in contrast with her material self-interest depends on her beliefs about the other N-1 players' choices and beliefs.
Second, assuming that the "conditional compliance" hypothesis holds, we examine the agreement's role in inducing compliance by the subjects. In this regard, we can distinguish between two approaches to the question of how the agreement -which in standard non cooperative game theory is just 'cheap talk' -influences the subjects' decision to comply. According to the first approach, the agreement performs a key role, and if it is associated with the appropriate expectations of reciprocal compliance, it induces subjects to comply. According to the second approach, the agreement is not important in itself. What matters is the presence of expectations about the existence of a norm (which may also originate from experience, education, communication etc.) which constitute the basis for the emergence of normative expectations .
A further question to be addressed concerns the relationship between the agreement and the emergence of expectations of reciprocal conformity. Sacconi and Faillo (2008) show that, for a significant number of subjects, the agreement is a sufficient condition to expect reciprocal conformity, and therefore to comply with the rule. As discussed elsewhere (Faillo and Sacconi, 2007) , an appropriate explanation for this finding cannot be based on a standard logical inference -according to which the existence of expectations of reciprocal conformity derives from the existence of the agreement -but should be based on non-monotonic logic and default reasoning.
The foregoing discussion can be further developed by looking at the few attempts made in the behavioral economics literature to devise a theory on conformity with social norms. In particular, we can identify two alternative interpretations of the "conditional compliance" hypothesis, which differ also in terms of the role assigned to the impartial agreement in explanation of norm compliance. Sacconi and Grimalda (2007) develop a model of conformist preferences based on psychological game theory. According to this model, a player characterized by conformist preferences complies if she participates in choosing the norm in a social contract setting (i.e. she participates in an ex-ante agreement on the norm), if she expects that other players who have contributed to choose the rule will comply (First Order Empirical Expectations) and if she expects that others will expect that she will comply (Second Order Empirical Expectations).
Cristina Bicchieri (2006) argues that compliance is observed when the player is aware of the norm's existence (the agreement is not necessary) and believes that a sufficiently large number of people comply with the norm (First Order Empirical Expectations); and either a sufficiently large number of people think that she ought to conform or a sufficiently large number of people are ready to sanction her for not conforming (Second Order Normative Expectations). Bicchieri and Xiao (2007) run an experiment in which they show that, when
normative expectations (what we believe others think ought to be done) and empirical expectations (what we expect others will actually do) are in contrast, subjects choose according to the latter. There are apparent similarities, but also important differences, between these two theories and the guilt aversion model (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) . According to the guilt aversion hypothesis, people care about what others expect them to do and feel guilty if they do not fulfill what they think are others' expectations. As in conformist preferences and Bicchieri's theory, people's behavior depends on their second order (empirical) beliefs; but differently from these two theories, in the guilt aversion model first order beliefs are not considered as drivers of individual choice.
In order to take account of the alternative interpretations of the "conditional compliance" hypothesis, in our experiment we investigated four types of expectations of a generic player i:
1 Further evidence on the role of empirical and normative expectations in fostering compliance with norms of fairness can be found in a recent paper by Krupka and Weber (2007 We studied the effect of the agreement on the emergence of different types of expectations, and the contribution of these different types of expectations to explanation of the decision to comply with a shared norm. We considered a simple game, and we started by studying the relationship between choice and expectations. To this end, we observed how the subjects played the game and we collected data on what they believed others would do and expect. We then added analysis of how the introduction (before the actual playing of the game) of an agreement on a non-binding division rule influenced the subjects' expectations, and consequently the way in which the game was played.
Finally, we considered the case in which subjects played the game with coplayers who were not those with whom they had participated in the agreement.
As will become clearer below, these steps corresponded to the three treatments of our experimental design: the Baseline Treatment (BT), the we could assess whether being in a group with individuals who had not been their partner in the agreement influenced the subjects' decision to comply.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, procedure and hypotheses, while Section 3 analyses the results. A discussion of the results and some concluding remarks end the paper (Section 4).
Experimental Design
The tool used was the Exclusion Game (Sacconi and Faillo, 2005; Faillo and Sacconi, 2007) , a sort of 'triple mini-dictator game'. This is a situation where 3 subjects -players A (A1, A2 and A3 respectively) -must decide how to allocate a sum S among themselves and a fourth subject -player B -who has no decisional power. In particular, A1, A2 and A3 have to decide separately and independently the amount that they want to request for themselves, choosing one of three possible strategies: asking for 25%, 30% or 33% of S.
The payoff for players A is exactly the sum requested for themselves (a1, a2 and a3 respectively), while the payoff for player B is the remaining sum (Sa1 -a2 -a3). In our experiment, each group was given 60 tokens -each token corresponded to ! 0.50 -and each player A's strategies were : "Ask for 15 tokens", "Ask for 18 tokens", "Ask for 20 tokens".
The experiment consisted of three treatments: the Baseline Treatment (BT), the
Agreement Treatment (AT) and the Outsider Treatment (OT).
In the Baseline Treatment participants were randomly distributed in groups of four players and played the Exclusion Game.
In the Agreement Treatment participants were randomly distributed in groups of four players and were told about the stages of the experiment and about the Exclusion Game. In the first stage, without knowing their role in the game, they took part in a voting procedure. In each group participants were invited to vote for a specific allocation rule. In particular, subjects had to vote for one of three alternative rules (the fourth number was the type B player's payoff): {15,15, 15,15},{18,18, 18,6}, {20,20, 20,0} . The first rule assigned the same payoff to every member of the group; the second rule corresponded to a partial inclusion of player B in the share-out the money; the third rule implied the total exclusion of the type B player.
2 Players had to reach a unanimous agreement on the rule within a limited number of trials (10 in our experiment).
Voting was computerized and completely anonymous. The agreement was not binding, but failure in reaching it was costly, since only groups who reached agreement in this first stage could participate in the second stage. In the second stage the composition of the groups was unchanged and roles were randomly assigned to implement the Exclusion Game. In this case, players A could either decide to implement the rule selected by vote or choose one of the alternative allocations. Players who did not enter the second stage waited until the end of the session. Their payoff was the show-up fee.
In the OT participants were randomly distributed in groups of four players, and they were instructed on the stages of the experiment and on the Exclusion
Game. The first stage, as well as the rule on entering the second stage, were the same as in the AT. At the beginning of the second stage, players were informed about their role, and groups were rematched. In particular, a player A for each group (the outsider) was reassigned to a different group and told about the rule chosen by the new group, while the other members of the group
did not know what rule the outsider's previous group had adopted. After the re-matching, the subjects played the Exclusion Game. For a summary of the three treatments see Figure 1 .
2 Note the correspondence between the rules and the strategies of the Exclusion Game: for players A compliance with the {15,15,15,15} rule implies choice of the "ask for 15 tokens" strategy; compliance with the {18,18,18,7} rule implies choice of the "ask for 18 tokens" strategy; and, finally, compliance with the {20,20,20,0} rule implies choice of the "ask for 120 tokens" strategy 2.1 Experimental Procedure. The experiment was programmed and conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) . The instructions were read by participants on their computer screen while an experimenter read them out loud.
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After the instructions had been read, and before the subjects were invited to take their decisions, some control questions were asked in order to ensure that the players had understood the rules of the game. At the end of each session, subjects were asked to fill in a questionnaire for the collection of sociodemographic data.
Players were given a show-up fee of 3 euros.
Beliefs elicitation.
In all the treatments, at the end of the game and before players were informed about the decisions taken during the Exclusion Game by the other co-players, first order and second order expectations (both normative and empirical) were elicited by means of a brief questionnaire. In particular, in each group each player made statements concerning:
1. the probabilities of each possible choice by co-players A (First Order Empirical Expectations);
2. the probability of each co-player's possible judgement about her own choice (Second Order Empirical Expectations);
3. the choice she considered to be the 'right' one A (First Order Normative Expectations);
4. the choice that co-players considered to be the 'right' one (Second Order Normative Expectations).
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In the OT, guesses about the behaviour and beliefs of partners and outsiders were elicited separately.
Only good guesses of the Empirical Expectations were rewarded on the basis of a quadratic scoring rule (Davis and Holt, 1993 Consequently, the players' choices in the Exclusion Game could be explained in terms of their expectations about the behaviour of the other players.
Moreover, if Bicchieri and Xiao (2007) are right, when normative and empirical expectations are in contrast, the latter play a more important role in players' decision-making.
Hypothesis 2 (H2):
In treatments AT and OT, agreement should be reached by all the groups because it is not binding but its failure is costly (failure would prevent the players from entering the second stage of the experiment).
Hypothesis 3 (H3):
The possibility of agreeing with a distributive norm enhances compliance by inducing a convergence of individual expectations. In 5 See appendix 1 for details on the belief elicitation procedure. 6 We used the following scoring rule:
where I k takes value 1 if the event realized is event k and 0 otherwise. p k is the probability associated with event k. The maximum score is a, and the minimum score is a-2b. We chose a=2 e b=1. 7 See for example Geanakoplos et al. (1989) ; Rabin, (1993); Dufwenberg (2006) other words, compliance can be explained in terms of the emergence of 
Data analysis
In this section we provide an overview of our experimental data and results by discussing two main points. First, we analyse the relation between beliefs and behaviour: in particular, we shall check whether beliefs influence the subjects' decision-making process. Second, we test whether and how different scenarios influence beliefs and, consequently, people's decisions.
Description
Overall, 216 undergraduate students took part in the experiment. 56 players were recruited for the BT, 72 for the AT, and 88 for the OT. We have observations of 42 subjects A in the BT, 54 in the AT, and 66 in the OT.
In the BT, the majority of players A chose to ask for the highest amount of tokens (20) 
Results

Result 1. The subjects' choices are in line with their expectations.
On checking for correlation between beliefs and decisions, we find that most of the players' choices are in line with either empirical or normative expectations (Table 2) . 8 However -as in Bicchieri and Xiao (2007) -when normative and empirical expectations are in contrast, the latter play a more important role in the players' decision-making ( As we expected, when agreement is possible, it is reached by all groups. This is a quite obvious result: agreement is not binding but failure in reaching it is costly. However, the interesting point is that the fair rule 15-15-15-15 seems to be a sort of focal point (see Table 4 ). What this means can be explained by looking at the results of the first voting attempt. playing the Exclusion Game, did 50% of subjects in the AT and 61% in the OT decide not to comply with the rule (Table 6 )? A possible explanation is that 'unfair' subjects voted for the non-binding 'fair' rule in order to end the time-consuming voting procedure. However, this was not enough for players who preferred the 'fair' rule. They knew perfectly well that the agreement was not binding (in fact, among players who eventually voted for a rule different from their first choice, 71% did not comply with it when playing the Exclusion Game) and if they thought that the other co-players were not complying, they probably defected as well. This would be in line both with the fact that empirical expectations are more important than normative ones, and with the higher probability of expecting the others to choose 20 (at least in the AT) as soon as the number of voting rounds increased (see Appendix 2).
Result 3. Agreement induces convergence of empirical expectations.
In the BT at least 70% of the players asked for 20, while in the AT only 37% of the participants asked for the maximum. This difference is significant (Mann-Whitney 10 ; p = 0.0002). However, our experimental hypothesis is more complicated and implies that our participants engage in a two-step reasoning process.
Step 1: the agreement influences the players' empirical expectations.
Step 2: empirical expectations define the subjects' choices. This means that we want to show that the difference between BT and AT is a consequence of the impact of the agreement on players' beliefs and preferences.
In the AT, 17 groups out of 18 chose the 15-15-15-15 rule, and 1 chose the 18-18-18-6 one. On analysing the subjects' expectations, we find that in the AT there is a significant decrease of subjects who think that the other members of their group have asked for 20 tokens (Table 7) . A probit regression -where the dependent variable is the probability of expecting the others to choose 20 -shows that subjects are more likely to expect selfish behaviour by the co-players in the BT (p = 0.000). A bivariate recursive probit confirms both the influence of beliefs on the subjects' decisions (p = 0.00) and the convergence of empirical expectations on a choice in line with the fair rule (p = 0.000). 11 More details on the econometric analysis are given in Appendix 2.
Result 4. Expectation of conformity is higher in the partner protocol.
When we introduce a mixed protocol whereby the Exclusion Game is played in groups where one subject is an 'outsider' (in the OT), a lower percentage of players comply with the chosen rule (Table 6 ). Again, our experimental hypothesis is that our participants engage in a two-step reasoning process.
Step 1: the introduction of an outsider influences the players' empirical expectations.
Step 2: empirical expectations define the subjects' choices. This means that, once again, we want to show that the difference between AT and OT is a consequence of the impact of the outsider on players' beliefs. If we analyse expectations, it turns out that in the AT players believe in their coplayers' compliance more than in the OT (Table 8) . A probit regression -where the dependent variable is the probability of expecting the others to comply -shows that subjects are more likely to expect compliance in the AT 
Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been twofold. Firstly, it has focused on the decisionmaking process that leads to the creation of a social norm. Secondly, it has analysed the mechanisms through which subjects conform their behaviour to the norm.
We can summarize our results as follows.
1) The subjects' choices are in line with their empirical expectations, and when normative and empirical expectations are in contrast, the latter play a more important role in the players' decisions (H1).
2) Agreement is reached in all groups (H2).
3) Even a non-binding agreement induces convergence of empirical expectations and, consequently, of choices (H3). Moreover, this finding confirms the robustness of the results obtained by Faillo and Sacconi (2008) . In particular, it is perfectly in line with the "conditional compliance" hypothesis, according to which subjects comply with a norm if they believe that other members of their group will comply and if they believe that other members of their group expect that they will comply (H3b).
4)
The results of the Outsider Treatment seems to suggest that participation in the agreement is a necessary condition for compliance.
When groups are rematched and one of the players A (the outsider) is assigned to a new group, the members of her new group (the insiders)
do not expect compliance from her, and consequently they do not comply (H3b). The outsider seems to acknowledge this, and, on expecting non-compliance by the insiders, she does not comply.
5) Our last result (a generally non significant correlation between Second
Order Normative Expectations and choice of conformity) does not confirm the hypothesis that both first order empirical expectations and second order normative expectations are necessary conditions for compliance (H3a). 
OUTSIDER TREATMENT
In this treatment we have to distinguish between the members of the group who have voted for the rule and are still in their original group and the Outsider (the subject who come from a different group). We use "Ax" and "Ay" to denote the members who have not changed group and "AO" to denote the outsider.
First Order Empirical Expectations (FOEE)
Questions for the Ax and Ay members Subjects were paid only for the accuracy of their guesses in FOEE and SOEE questions according the Quadratic Scoring Rule (Davis and Holt, 1993 ).
When we examine the relation between subjects' choices and beliefs, we consider only first order expectations (both empirical and normative). This is due to a preliminary analysis on beliefs. To sum up, we find that second order expectations are generally in line with first order expectations. This makes it to study the relation between choices and beliefs by taking only first order expectations into account.
Appendix 2 -The Econometric Analysis
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(R1) (R1) is a probit regression that we implement to explore what variables influence the subjects' probability of expecting that the others have chosen 20. The dependent variable is the dichotomous variable FOEE_20, which is equal to 1 if a subject expects the others to have chosen 20. The control variables are both related to the nature of the experiment (AT, FIRST*AT, TENT) and demographic (AGE). We exclude the variable GENDER since it turns out that in the first two treatments GENDER and AGE are significantly correlated (Pearson coefficient; p < 0.01) -the women are significantly older than the men (ttest; p = 0.002). AT is a dummy equal to 1 if the AT is played. TENT is the number of voting rounds for the group before it reaches a unanimous decision on the rule to be used -variable equal to 0 when the BT is played. FIRST*AT is an interaction term equal to 0 either when the BT is played or when the player in the AT have participated in other experiments in the past. 13 Multicollinearity -a usual problem of probit regressions -is detected using VIF tests.
Probit Model -R1
(R1) show that subjects are more likely to expect selfish behaviour by the coplayers in the BT. Moreover, it emerges that, in the AT, the higher the number of voting rounds before the group reaches a unanimous decision on the rule to be used, the higher the probability of the subjects expecting selfish behaviour by the co-players. Finally, in the AT, a player who has never participated in other experiments in the past has a higher probability of asking for a sum different from 20.
(R2) is a bivariate recursive probit regression 14 where CHOICE_20 is equal to 1 if subject i choose 20 tokens. It makes it possible to check: 1) the relation among agreement, beliefs and choices; 2) whether there is any latent variable that might influence beliefs and choices at the same time.
Bivariate Recursive Probit Model -R2
Variables FOEE_20 CHOICE_20 (R4) shows that introduction of the mixed protocol influences empirical expectations and that empirical expectations influenced the subjects' decisions. Moreover, because rho is not significantly different from 0, we can state that there is no latent variable influencing beliefs and choices at the same time.
